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THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST IN
CRIMINAL LAW
Dan M. Kahan*
THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST. By
Mass.: Harvard University Press.

I.

William Ian Miller. Cambridge,
1997. Pp. 320. $24.95.

A CONCEPTUA L BLINDSPOT

My goal in this review is to call attention to a defect in the domi
nant theories of criminal law and to identify a resource for remedy
ing it. The defect is the absence of a sophisticated account of how
disgust does and should influence legal decisionmaking. The cor
rective resource is William Miller's The Anatomy of Disgust.1
To make my claims more vivid, consider two stories. Both in
volve men who were moved to kill by disgust toward
homosexuality.
Stephen Roy Carr observed two female hikers in the woods and
decided to follow them at a distance. That night, as the women
were engaged in lovemaking at their secluded campsite, the armed
Carr burst from his hiding place and shot them repeatedly, killing
one and severely injuring the other.2 Carr maintained at trial that
"the 'show' put on by the women, including their nakedness, their
hugging and kissing and their oral sex," had filled him with over
powering revulsion.3 In support of this defense - which he offered
to mitigate the charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter4 Carr proffered psychiatric evidence relating to his rejection by his
mother, whom he suspected of being a lesbian, and by other
women.5 After the judge refused to admit this evidence, Carr was
convicted of first-degree murder.6 The Pennsylvania Superior
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D.
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Elizabeth Garrett, Richard Helm
holz, Andrew Koppleman, John Lott, Tracey Meares, Richard Pildes, Richard A. Posner,
Cass Sunstein, and Daniel Yeager for comments; to Jason Fliegel for research assistance; and
to the Russell J. Parsons and Jerome S. Weiss Faculty Research Funds at the University of
Chicago Law School for generous financial support.

1. William Miller is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.
2. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See generally
CLAUDIA BRENNER, EmIIT BULLETS: ONE WoMAN's STORY OF SURVIVING ANTI-GAY VIO
LENCE (1995) (relating the surviving victim's account).
3. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364.
4. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-65.
5. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-64.
6. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-65.
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Court affirmed.7 "[The law] does not recognize homosexual activ
ity between two persons as legal provocation sufficient to reduce an
unlawful killing ...from murder to voluntary manslaughter,"the
court concluded.8 "A reasonable person would simply have discon
tinued his observation and left the scene ...."9
Richard Lee Bernardski was convicted of a double murder.10
Evidence at trial demonstrated that the eighteen-year-old Bernard
ski and his friends had set out one evening to "pester the homosex
uals."11 They proceeded to a part of town known for its gay
nightlife and accepted a ride from two gay men whom they met
there.12 After the group drove to a remote spot in the woods,
Bernardski ordered the gay men to strip.13 When they refused,
Bernardski drew a pistol and opened fire,killing both.14 Unlike the
judge in the Carr case, however, the judge who presided over
Bernardski's trial expressed sympathy for Bernardski's revulsion.
"I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level,"the judge ex
plained, "and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a
prostitute."15 After all, he said, Bernardski's victims would not
have been killed "if they hadn't been cruising the streets picking up
teen-age boys "; "I don't much care for queers cruising the streets
[picking up teen-age boys]. I've got a teen-age boy."16 The judge
rejected the prosecution's recommendation of life imprisonment
and instead sentenced Bernardski to a term in line with the ones
imposed for persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter.17
Which judge got it right - the one who refused to let Carr tell
his story of disgust ; or the one who not only listened to Bernardski,
but who mitigated the sentence because of his own disgust toward
homosexuality? Can we possibly answer this question without
some account of what disgust is? Maybe disgust consists, as Carr
seemed to suggest,of an impulsive and unthinking revulsion toward
its object. If so,then shouldn't the court have admitted Carr's psy
chiatric evidence to determine whether his disgust had impaired his
capacity for self-control and hence his moral responsibility for his
7. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1367.
8. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364-65.
9. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364.
10. See Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence For Killer of2 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1988, at 8; Judge ls Censured Over Remark on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1989, at A28.
11. Belkin, supra note 10, at 8 (quoting testimony at trial).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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behavior?18 If that's what disgust is and why it matters, shouldn't
the judge who sentenced Bemardski have been less sympathetic both because Bemardski's attack was so clearly premeditated, and
because the judge himself had a duty to rely on reason, rather than
instinctive aversions, in fashioning an appropriate sentence?
Or perhaps disgust embodies an evaluative appraisal that is it
self susceptible of being evaluated as morally true or false.19 But in
that case, we can again ask, who got it right - the court in Carr,
when it labeled the defendant's disgust "unreasonable"; or the
judge in Bernardski, when he allowed his own disgust to tell him
that the defendant deserved mitigation for his? The conventional
principles of homicide law don't supply answers to these questions,
because those principles have nothing to say about the nature of
disgust.
This frustrating muteness generalizes. Many jurisdictions au
thorize the death penalty for murders that are "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" or the like.20 This formulation
says, in effect, that capital sentencers - typically juries - should
trust their own disgust sensibilities to identify which murderers de
serve to die. But why should we have this much confidence in dis
gust to discern what's just?
Many judges now punish offenders with shaming penalties from bumper stickers for drunk drivers, to stigmatizing publicity for
men convicted of soliciting prostitutes, to signs or even distinctive
clothing for thieves.21 Shame and disgust are obviously related:
those who are shamed predictably incur the diSgust of others and
even of themselves (pp. 34, 80). Is the eliciting of disgust an appro
priate or sensible aim of punishment?
Finally, the law often treats disgust toward an activity- such as
obscenity or sodomy - as sufficient to make it criminal. Is disgust
by itself a legitimate ground for coercion?
Miller's work, I will try to show, furnishes a solid theoretical
foundation for addressing the role that judgments of and about dis
gust play in the criminal law. Drawing on a rich variety of sources
in psychology, history, literature, and philosophy, Miller paints a
18. See Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections
on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 726, 753-56 (1995) (defending the use of the provocation defense in "homo
sexual advance" cases on this ground).
19. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Criminal
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 285-89 (1996) (describing the "evaluative conception" of
emotion).
20. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)(6)
(1994) (authorizing the death penalty in "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" cases).
21. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
631-34 (1996) (discussing "the shaming alternative").
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vivid picture of disgust as "a moral and social sentiment" (p.2). By
"mark[ing] out moral matters for which we can have no compro
mise" (p.194), disgust, he convincingly argues, plays an indispensa
ble role in our evaluative life. It plays just as important a role,
moreover, in social life, "rank[ing] people and things in a kind of
cosmic ordering" (p.2), and thus supplying "the basis for honoring
and respecting as well as for dishonoring and disrespecting" (p.
202). These insights do not by themselves resolve all of the criminal
law controversies in which disgust figures - a topic, sadly, about
which Miller himself has little to say. But they do, I believe, help to
reveal exactly what is at stake in these disputes, and why they take
on the political salience that they typically do.
Indeed, Miller's account can help us to see why, despite the per
vasiveness-of judgments of and about disgust in criminal law, offi
cial and academic criminal law theory has so little to say about it.
Disgust, Miller shows us, is brazenly and uncompromisingly judg
mental; the moral idiom of modem liberalism is not. Miller attrib
utes the relatively peripheral role that disgust plays in this discourse
to "[a] newer style of moralist, ...one for whom tolerance and
respect for persons are fundamental virtues" and who therefore
"wish[es] our disgust sensitivities lowered so we would be less sus
ceptible to finding difference and strangeness sources of disgust" (p.
179). The dominant forms of normative theorizing in criminal law
are no less averse to the kind of intolerant moralizing that disgust
embodies. Miller argues that it's naYve for contemporary moral the
orists to pretend that disgust doesn't influence moral judgments; I
want to suggest that the willful blindness of criminal theorists to
ward disgust is even worse than that.
II. MILLER'S DISGUST
Miller addresses disgust as part of an ongoing project to defend
a style of social theorizing that "privileges the emotions in general
and certain emotions in particular" (p.21). This project has two
adversaries: behaviorist forms of social science, which "try to ex
plain most social action by reference to self-interest" and thus ig
nore emotions altogether (p.x); and contemporary psychoanalysis,
which "reduc[es emotions] to mere veneering on [some] underlying
oedipal master narrative" (p.xii). In the place of these emotion
inattentive accounts, Miller seeks to show that the contours of a
community's emotional life "make possible social orderings of par
ticular stripes," and that it therefore "behooves social and political
theory to care about these emotions" (p.18). The Anatomy of Dis-
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is the second installment in this project; the first was Miller's
book Humiliation,22 and the next a forthcoming book on cowardice.

gust

Unlike the social scientists and psychoanalysts he attacks, Miller
is a social constructivist.23 On this view, social norms and meanings
determine the content of emotions, which in turn reinforce those
norms and meanings.24 "Emotions," Miller contends, "are feelings
linked to ways of talking about those feelings, to social and cultural
paradigms that make sense of those feelings by giving us a basis for
knowing when they are properly felt and properly displayed" (p. 8).
This is so for "even the most visceral" emotions, such as disgust:
Even when the source of disgust is our own body the interpretations
we make of our bodily secretions and excretions are deeply embed
ded in elaborate social and cultural systems of meaning. Feces,
anuses, snot, saliva, hair, sweat, pus, the odors that emanate from our
body and from those of others come with social and cultural histories
attached to them. [p. 8]

At the same time, emotions such as anger, humiliation, and disgust
have "functions": they enable certain experiences and foreclose
others, in much the way that language selectively enables thoughts;
they supply powerful "motives for action," demarking some exper
iences and objects as worthy of aspiration and others as not (pp. 8,
18). For these reasons, emotions inevitably feed back into the
norms and meanings that construct them, entrenching those phe
nomena as the basis of a community's distinctive mode of social
organization (p. 217 ).
For Miller, disgust is constructed by norms of hierarchy. "Dis
gust evaluates (negatively) what it touches, proclaim[ing] the mean
ness and inferiority of its object" (p. 9). It is suffused, too, with
"ideas of a particular kind of danger, the danger inherent in pollu
tion and contamination, the danger of defilement" (p. 8). Accord
ingly, we feel urgently constrained to remove or eliminate the
offending object, or to cleanse ourselves after contact with it, lest it
contaminate us and bring us down to its level. In this way, disgust
"presents a nervous claim of right to be free of the dangers imposed
by the proximity of the inferior. It is thus an assertion of a claim to
superiority that at the same time recognizes the vulnerability of that
superiority to the defiling powers of the low" (p. 9).
This sensibility in turn constructs the hierarchies that give rise to
it. At the level of perception, disgust naturally "ranks people and
things" (p. 2). "[A]long with desire, [it] locates the bounds of the
other, either as something to be avoided, repelled, or attacked, or,
22. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION (1993).
23. For a general account of this approach to emotions, see Claire Armon-Jones, The
Thesis of Constructionism, in THE SocIAL CoNSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 32 (Rom Harre ed.,
1986).
24. See id. at 33-34.
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in other settings, as something to be emulated, imitated, or mar
ried "(p. 50). It "build[s] ...moral and social community "by "sep
arating our group from their group "(p. 194), by "prevent[ing] our
way from being subsumed into their way " (p. 50). At the level of
action, disgust is a powerful "motivator of discipline and social con
trol " (p. 80). It impels us to steer clear of deviance, both to avoid
the acute discomfort of being disgusted with ourselves, and to avoid
the unpleasant consequences of being the object of the disgust of
others. It likewise impels us to shun deviants, both to avoid their
potentially contaminating influence, and to suppress the subversive
claims to respect that their behavior embodies. "If you were casu
ally to enumerate the norms and values, aesthetic and moral, whose
breach prompts disgus�, you wou],d see just how crucial the emotion
is to keeping us in line and minimally presentable "(p. 18).
Of course, there is by no means universal agreement on what or who - is disgusting. Variation in disgust sensibilities across soci
eties and across communities within a single society is another phe
nomenon that Miller's social constructivist account is uniquely
suited to explaining. '.'It is culture, not nature, that draws lines be
tween defilement and purity, clean and filthy, those crucial bounda
ries disgust is called on to police "(p. 15). Miller sounds a note of
moderation on this score. Certainly, there are some things among them incest, excrement, and (according to Miller) menstrual
blood - that virtually no society excludes from the disgust menu,
perhaps for sociobiological reasons. Nevertheless, there is a signifi
cant residuum of variation, especially on what to include, that must
in the end be chalked up to the diversity of cultural norms (pp. 15-

16).

In our day, we are accustomed not only to variance in percep
tions of disgust, but also to political contention over them. To
whose sensibilities should the law defer - the heterosexual soldiers
who- are disgusted by the idea of sharing barracks with gays or op
ponents of the gay-soldier ban who are disgusted by homophobia?2s
With whom should we be disgusted - the National Endowment for
the Arts for funding sacrilegious art or conservative congressmen
for proposing to screen NBA grant applications for offensiveness?26
25. Compare Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Chief Warns Clinton on Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

1993, at Al ("The Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by Gen. Colin L. Powell, contend that
repealing the ban would wreck morale and discipline, undermine recruiting, [and] force de
voutly religious service members to resign.") with 139 CoNo. REc. H9656 (Nov. 15, 1993)
(remarks of Rep. Woolsey) (deriding tlie Pentagon's policy as "offensive" and "appall[ing]").
26. Compare Amei Wallach, The Funding Fight, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1989, §II, at 4 (re
porting tlie controversy surrounding tlie NEA's funding of "Piss Christ," a crucifix sub
merged in artist's urine) with Valerie Richardson, Helms' Photo in Urine at NEA-Funded
Show, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al (reporting the controversy surrounding the NEA's
funding of "Piss Helms," a urine-submerged photograph of Sen. Jesse Helms, the sponsor of
legislation to ban tlie funding of disgusting art).
25,
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Miller's account helps to explain these types of disagreements, too.
Hierarchy not only constructs disgust; disgust also constructs norms
of hierarchy. "[W]hat is being established or confirmed" when we
experience it "is [the] relative social and moral value" of its object
(p. 217). It's predictable, then, that the shifting content of disgust
would spark contention, particularly in a pluralistic society. "In
[the] hurly-burly of anxious competition for status," different
groups aggressively market their favored conceptions of disgust
"either to maintain rank already achieved, to test whether it ha[s]
been achieved, or to challenge for its acquisition" (p. 217). Miller
sees this dynamic at work in challenges to "hierarchies based on
race, ethnicity, gender, physical and mental handicap, sexual orien
tation" and the like, movements that are concerned at least as much
with securing "changes in the emotional economy" as they are with
securing "equal rights" (p. 235).
Miller develops this account of disgust across a series of topics
as diverse as the methodologies and disciplines on which he draws.
Early on in the book, he undertakes a rigorous philosophical analy
sis aimed at distinguishing disgust from related emotions. Both fear
and disgust, for example, make us crave distance from their objects,
but fear is content merely to escape, whereas disgust "puts us to the
burden of cleansing and purifying, a much more intensive and prob
lematic labor" (p. 26). Indignation and disgust are both emotions
of disapprobation, but whereas indignation tends to be "precise in
its manner, focusing on particular wrongs" to the person experienc
ing it, disgust "is a more generalizing moral sentiment casting blame
on whole styles of behavior and personality traits" with an intensity
that indignation rarely matches (pp. 35-36).
The middle chapters present a revolting but riveting phenome
nology of disgust. Here Miller catalogs the various things that dis
gust us (bad breath, pubic hair, rotting food, masturbation, even
laughter) as well as the diverse modes
- (oral, olfactory, anal) of taking the disgusting in.
One of Miller's most compelling claims relates to intimacy,
which, he argues, consists in the "suspension of certain important
disgust sensitivities and rules" (pp. 20). For one thing, those with
whom we spend our private time inevitably come into contact with
the smells and emissions that we succeed, with effort, in masking or
containing in public (pp. 138-39). But the relationship between dis
gust and intimacy turns out to be much more fundamental than this.
"[T]he boundary of the self is manned at its most crucial and vul
nerable points by disgust" (p. 137). For that very reason, there can
be no more potent "means for demonstrating 'and proving love"
than to forebear - or even invite - the transgression of such a
boundary (p. 137). By handling their children's' feces and vomit,
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parents mark themselves out as "those who will care no matter
what" (pp. 133, 134-35). "[S]omeone else's tongue in your mouth
can be a sign of intimacy [precisely] because it can also be a disgust
ing assault" (p. 137). In this improbable manner, disgust enables us
to experience love's signature merging of self into other.
Another provocative thesis is the link Miller sees between dis
gust and misogyny. "[T]he durability of misogyny," he argues,
"owes much to male disgust for semen," which Miller describes as
"perhaps the most powerfully contaminating emission" (pp. 19-20).
Men are sickened by their own sperm not merely "because it shares
a pathway with urine" or even "because it has other primary disgust
features (it is slimy, sticky, and viscous)," but primarily "because it
appears under conditions that are dignity-destroying, a prelude to
the mini-shames attendant on post-ejaculatory tristesse" (pp. 10304). Thus, according to Miller, men loathe women both as the insti
gators of the indignity of ejaculation and as the receptacles of their
ejaculate - a claim for which Miller finds evidence in "the enor
mous expenditures on pharmaceuticals, personal 'hygiene' prod
ucts, and advertising designed to cleanse the whole terrain" of the
vagina (p. 104).
After a brief excursion into history, the book concludes with
three masterful chapters on the moral and political significance of
disgust. Drawing on Adam Smith - whose "moral world," Miller
argues, was "primarily one of shame [and] disgust . . . rather than
one of guilt and anger" (p. 189) - Miller depicts disgust as an indis
pensable member of our moral vocabulary. "It signals seriousness,
commitment, indisputability, presentness, and reality" (p. 180); "it
marks out moral matters for which we can have no compromise" (p.
194), "harms that sicken us in the telling, things for which there
could be no plausible claim of right" (p. 36). No other moral senti
ment is up to the task of condemning such singular abominations as
"rape, child abuse, torture, genocide, predatory murder and maim
ing"; bare indignation, for example, is too self-centered, too ob
sessed with "setting the balance right" for perceived slights to one's
own person, to motivate the impassioned desire to punish such
wrongs even when visited upon strangers (pp. 36, 186, 195). Indeed,
we cannot "put cruelty first among vices," writes Miller, unless we
treat properly directed disgust as one of our virtues.27
Nevertheless, disgust can also mislead because of its sweep. Un
like moral sentiments such as guilt and anger, disgust is not much
concerned with whether a person's failings originate in culpable
choices; it regards those arising from unchosen defects of character
- indeed, unchosen.defects themselves - as proper objects of re27. Here Miller draws on the philosopher Judith Shklar. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, 0RDI·
VICES (1984).

NARY
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vulsion as well: we are disgusted not just by· cruelty but also by
stupidity, ugliness, and deformity (p. 198). Moreover, disgust im
plores us to condemn persons for these failings. We rationalize our
aversions to them by "imput[ing] intentionality to their disgusting
ness" (p. 65); we "blame[ ] [them] for not attending to the special
duties to avoid contact that their pariah status imposes on them" (p.
65); and we ultimately "judg[e]" them for what they are, "according
[them] a lower place in the moral and social order because of" their
unchosen defects (p. 183). In this way, disgust collapses the "dis
tinction between the moral and the aesthetic" (p. 21) - a distinc
tion that can itself be "understood to be ...a moral claim about the
proper content of the moral," intended "to cabin by a fiat of catego
rization the rather insistent psychological and social tendencies we
evince to accord moral significance to beauty and ugliness and to
fail to distinguish consistently the good from the beautiful" (p.200).
As a result of the moral claims of disgust, "[w]e end up punishing
the stigmatized, who may have no justifiable cause for feeling guilty
for their stigma, although they often internalize the social judg
ments of their stigmatization as shame, self-loathing, self-disgust,
self-contempt, self-hatred" (p. 202).
"Our moral world is thus at odds with itself'' (p. 201). "We fear
that disgust and contempt may violate norms of fairness and justice,
of a liberal respect for persons; that they may maintain brutal and
indefensible regimes" (p. 202). The solution; however, can't be to
banish disgust and related sentiments, for "despite their considera
ble warts contempt and disgust do proper moral work" (p. 202).
"What we need," then, "are ways of knowing when to trust our dis
gust and contempts" (p. 202). For that purpose, moreover, there is
no mechanical algorithm to apply; we can do no better than to
"limit[ ] the scope of [disgust's] legitimacy by recourse to other
norms we accept" (p. 202).
No doubt in part because of its indispensable
if problematic
- moral function, disgust also plays an inescapable role in ordering
political and social life. The ordering, of course, is hierarchical; but
the fascinating point is that disgust and related sentiments, accord
ing to Miller, do no less hierarchical ordering in contemporary dem
ocratic regimes than they did in historical aristocratic ones. In
democracy, disgust becomes aligned with a species of "upward con
tempt" in which members of lower classes feel empowered to look
down on members of higher ones, whose "manner and smell reveal
the[ir] feminization" (pp. 207, 253) - a metaphor that underscores
the affinity between disgust and misogyny. Of course, the high for
their part continue to look down on the .low as well. Indeed, "the
mutuality of contempt," not the obliteration of it, is "what pluralis
tic democracy is all about" (p.234). For that reason, groups seeking
to raise their status in society are more intent on appropriating the
-
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idiom of disgust and turning it on their detractors than on van
quishing those sensibilities altogether (pp. 235-37).
Still, the durability of disgust does ultimately constrain the
forms of equality that society can experience, because at least some
of those forms do demand that we overcome our revulsions toward
those who aren't like us. This is the theme of the concluding essay
of the book, "Orwell's Sense of Smell," in which Miller details
George Orwell's disgust for the grimy lack of hygiene he encoun
tered in the home of the workers whom the English socialists
wished to organize (pp. 235-54). No amount of bathing, Miller sug
gests, would have solved this problem either, for Orwell's disgust
was constructed as much by his belief in the filthiness of the work
ers as the reality of their grime: "Whether they really smelled or
not, a stench would be imputed to them and presumably suggestion
and wishful thinking made it so" (p. 247). In the end, then, social
ism founders not on the shoals of individual self-interest or greed
but on the disgust sensibilities of the elite, in whose nostrils the
working class will always stink.
III.

APPROPRIATING MILLER'S DISGllSTFOR CRIMINAL LAW

How persuasive is Miller's account? His analysis can be - and
has been - criticized on numerous grounds.28 For an avowed so
cial constructivist, Miller shows surprisingly little interest in cross
cultural variation in disgust sensibilities. He can't be faulted for
aiming to produce an account that "resonat[es] with Americans of
[his] social class" (p. 11) - who else could really be expected to
read it? - but he can be faulted for assuming that their under
standing of disgust wouldn't be deepened by knowing how theirs
differs from that of others. In addition, Miller's methods are decid
edly nonempirical, consisting largely in his interpretations of se
lected works of literature, philosophy, and Freudian psychology,
leavened with liberal doses of introspection and personal anecdote.
As a result, many . of Miller's central claims - including the as
serted loathsomeness of semen - seem idiosyncratic, if not weirdly
autobiographical.
Even more critically, Miller simply assumes that disgust is a uni
tary phenomenon. His account ranges over a breathtakingly wide
expanse of aversions - from the shuddering horror we have to
ward snakes to the niggling irritation we have toward strange
sounding laughter; from the sickening heaviness we experience
from eating too much rich food to the incensed outrage we experi
ence toward heinous crimes. We do in fact use the term disgust to
28. See, e.g., Robert Grudin, Eeew! Grossi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, §7, at 34; Martha
C. Nussbaum, Foul Play, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997, at 32.
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refer to all of these sensibilities, but does it follow that what we find
appalling about each is really the "same"? If that isn't so - if, in
fact, "disgust," like "bad" or "unpleasant," is a conventional short
hand for diverse collections of aversions that can't intelligibly be
extricated from the particular settings in which we experience them
- then an account that tries to amalgamate all of our "disgust"
usages into one master conception amounts to a contrived and fu
tile exercise.
My aim, however, is not to determine whether Miller gets it
right about disgust. Rather, it is to see whether Miller's account
supplies a useful remedy for the inattention to disgust in criminal
law theory. And for that purpose, it is neither necessary nor suffi
cient that his account be true in some abstract philosophical sense.
Tue law has its own distinctive purposes and needs. If it doesn't
suit these, even an admittedly true account of disgust would be ir
relevant or possibly even pernicious. By the same token, the law
might be justified in accepting the guidance of an admittedly false
account if it could nonetheless be shown to be useful.29

I believe Miller's account is extremely useful both for under
standing and for evaluating the role of a particular type of recurring
disgust sensibility in criminal law. Broadly speaking, this is the sen
sibility of revulsion that individuals experience when confronted by
others - whether sexual deviants or sadistic criminals - whose
values seem shockingly alien and dangerous. Tue desire to separate
them from the rest of us - literally or symbolically - motivates
individuals to lash out against them in violence, and communities to
punish them in appropriately severe and expressive ways.
Recognizing this species of motivation fills a sizeable gap in the
dominant theories of criminal law. Neither consequentialism, which
focuses on the future societal benefits associated with punishing a
particular offender, nor voluntarism, which insists that we confine
punishment to those who freely choose to break the law, take any
overt stance on the moral quality of offenders' values.30 Their tax
onomies of relevant emotions are correspondingly limited: they
purport to tell us how the law will deal with fear or anger to the
extent that those passions can be understood to correlate with a
person's propensity for violence or to undermine her volition to a
particular degree; but they have notQ.!ng to say about disgust under
stood as an aversion to deviancy. As a result, the dominant theories

29. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 350; cf. Frederick Schauer, Commensura
bility and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 786 (1994) (defending a

mode of analysis that values "philosophical positions strategically on the basis of their ex
pected consequences").
30. See generally Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 301-05.
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lack the conceptual resources to make sense of a diverse range of
legal phenomena that are concerned with exactly that sensibility.
But as important as disgust so conceived is to criminal law, it
should also be clear that my claims about it are limited. In particu
lar, unlike Miller, I have no stake in demonstrating that the salient
features of this species of "disgust" are in fact essential to all the
diverse sensibilities conventionally· assigned that label. Indeed,
nothing in particular rides on whether aversion to deviant values is
properly called "disgust," although that is usually what it's called in
the contexts I'll address. Nor will I be attempting to show that what
I'm calling "disgust" for this purpose explains every important fea
ture of criminal law. Appraisals of anger, fear, and other emotions
also explain a lot (although, as Martha Nussbaum and I have ar
gued elsewhere, the way in which the law appraises them differs
from what either consequentialism or voluntarism contemplates 3)1 .
The next two parts of this review use Miller's account to explain
and appraise the role of disgust in criminal law. To set up that dis
cussion, I want to distill from Miller four distinct theses that I be
lieve have particular relevance.
The first I'll call the evaluative thesis. Broadly speaking, the
Western tradition in philosophy and the social sciences reflects two
competing conceptions of emotion. The mechanistic conception
sees emotions as thoughtless surges of affect, or bare physiological
impulses. The evaluative conception treats emotions as embodying
a person's cognitive evaluations of particular goods and exper
iences. It holds, too, that emotions, as judgments of this sort, can
themselves be evalµated as true or, false, good or bad, reasonable or
unreasonable, and not just as strong or.weak. 32
By virtue of the connection he sees. between disgust and social
norms, Miller falls squarely into the evaluative camp. For him, dis
gust is not a "purely instinctual drive"; nor can it be flatly equated
with any physiological. state, such as nausea (pp. 7-8). Rather,
"[d]isgust necessarily involves pcµ-ticular thoughts" - themselves
culturally determined - "about the repugnance of that which is its
object" (p. 8). Disgust "evaluates (negatively) what it touches, pro
claim[ing] the meanness and inferiority of its object" and the imper
ative of being rid of it lest one be contaminated by it and thus
lowered in status (pp. 8-9). What's more, we can and do evaluate
persons based on the content of their disgust sensibilities: "depend
ing on how far they deviate from our norms," we view individuals
whose sensibilities are less sensitive or simply different from ours
31. See id. at 301-46.
32. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 275-301; see also MICHAEL STOKER &
E LIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS (1996) (defending an evaluative conception).
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"either as foreign or primitive and thus vaguely exotic, or as bar
baric and disgusting" in their own right (pp. 11-12).
Second is the hierarchy thesis. The social function of disgust,
according to Miller, is to construct and reinforce status rankings.
Disgust sensibilities police social boundaries, determining who de
serves esteem and admiration and who loathing and contempt. By
feeling it and acting on it, individuals prevent subversion of the
norms that keep the low in their proper place and assure the high
their own preeminence. Disgust and related sensibilities thus
"work to hierarchize our political order: in some settings they do
the work of maintaining hierarchy; in other settings they constitute
righteously presented claims for superiority; in yet other settings
they are themselves elicited as an indication of one's proper place
ment in the social order" (pp. 8-9).
Third is the conservation thesis. Although the objects of disgust
vary across societies and communities, all societies inevitably make
use of disgust to inform their judgments of high and low, worthy
and unworthy. This is so not only for aristocratic regimes, in which
distinctions of class are uncontested, but also for egalitarian demo
cratic ones, which are "based less on mutual respect for persons
than on a ready availability of certain styles of contempt to the low
that once were the prerogatives of the high" (p. 21). The conserva
tion of disgust across distinct and evolving modes of social organiza
tion explains why groups that are low in status seek to appropriate
rather than annihilate the idiom of disgust, and why disgust, rather
than disappearing, instead becomes a salient focal point for political
contention within socially fluid, pluralistic societies. The question is
never whether a society should organize itself around emphatic
ideas of high and low, worthy and worthless, but only what tlie con
tent of those animating hierarchies will be.
Fourth is the moral ambivalence thesis. For Miller, our moral
world is tragically configured: We need disgust to mark the em
phatic nature of our strongest moral commitments and to motivate
us to punish atrocious wrongs against strangers. Yet Miller recog
nizes, too, that disgust has the power to mislead by treating "beauty
and ugliness [as] a matter of morals" (p. 200), and thus importuning
us to hold persons accountable for nonculpable defects of character.
There is, sadly, no reliable moral theory that stands outside our dis
gust sensibilities and that we can treat as normative for them. All
we can do is test the urgent claims of disgust by appeal to "other
moral sentiments, like guilt and benevolence," (p. 197) and to
"other norms we accept" (p. 202).
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A. Disgust Crimes
What to do about "hate crimes" - assaults motivated by ani
mus toward victims' group identities - is now an issue of national
concem.33 Should persons who commit such offenses be punished
more severely? If they kill, should they be ineligible for Initigation
under the voluntary manslaughter doctrine? Indeed, should group
hatred be a grounds for the death penalty? If the answer to any of
these question is yes, which kinds of group animus - those based
on race, religion, and ethnicity only, or also those based on gender
and sexual orientation - should the law concern itself with? These
are all issues of dispute.34 Drawing on Miller, I want to suggest that
the "hate crimes" debate is better understood as a "disgust crimes"
debate: at issue is whom we should regard as low and containinat
ing - the persons singled out for attacks on the basis of their iden
tities, or the persons who attack them for that reason.
Return to Carr and Bemardski, the cases with which I started
this review. The disagreement between them is in fact representa
tive of a schism in the law over whether killers should be perinitted
to assert ho.mophobia - frequently styled "homosexual panic" syn
drome by expert witnesses35 - as Initigation under the voluntary
manslaughter doctrine.36 The source of the disagreement seems
puzzling under the standard view of how that doctrine works: if
voluntary manslaughter Initigates when strong impulses underinine
the offender's volition,37 then why wouldn't jurisdictions converge
on an approach to such killings based on prevailing scientific views
33.

See, e.g., James Bennet, Clinton Backs .Expanding Definition of a Hate Crime, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov.

11, 1997, at A20.

34. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. S12577 (Nov. 13, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (advo
cating the addition of assaults motivated by animus against gays, women, and the handi
capped to federal "hate crimes" legislation); The 'Hate-Crime' Problem, Editorial, WASH.
PoST, Nov. 17, 1997, at A22 ("[T]he victim of a bias- motivated stabbing is no more dead
than someone stabbed during a mugging. Ultimately, we prosecute crimes, not feelings.
Guiding how people feel about one another is only marginally a law enforcement concern.");
Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12 (criticizing federal legisla
tion aimed at treating certain forms of violence as "hate crimes" against women).
35. See, e.g., Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Posner, J.,
concurring); People v. Cord, 607 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Dietrich, 567
So. 2d 623, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Thomas, 616 A.2d 365, 370 (Md. 1992).
36. Compare, e.g., Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Ho
mosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133 (1992) (collecting author
ities and arguing against permitting use of the manslaughter theory in such circumstances)
with Dressler, supra note 18 (defending the availability of manslaughter).

37. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Ra
tionale, 73 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467 (1982) (rationalizing the doctrine on these
grounds). But see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 306-10 (challenging this view).
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on whether "homosexual panic" impairs self-control?38 Indeed, the
disagreement in the cases doesn't seem to have much at all to do
with the effect of this condition on offenders' volition. The court in
Carr, for example, refused even to consider psychiatric evidence re
lating to the intensity of the defendant's homophobia,39 whereas the
court in Bernardski cheerfully mitigated the defendant's sentence
notwithstanding the premeditated nature of his attack.40
But Miller's account of disgust suggests a set of hypotheses that
clarify matters. Clearly offenders who kill (or assault) on the basis
of "homosexual panic" are disgusted by their victims. Under the
evaluative thesis, what would be distinctive about their aversion
wouldn't be its physiological intensity - a mechanistic notion but rather its embodiment of the offenders' appraisal of gays and
lesbians as inferior and contaminating. Under the hierarchy thesis,
the offenders' animus would be constructed by and reinforce status
norms, which the offenders understand to be threatened by homo
sexuality. By the same token, we would have to understand courts
to be evaluating the offenders' disgust sensibilities and constructing
norms of hierarchy by deciding how severely to punish them. Deci
sions that withhold mitigation would be doing this every bit as
much as ones that grant it. Indeed, consistent with the conservation
thesis, we should expect to see the forces who are committed to
raising the status of gays and lesbians engaged in their own effort to
seize hold of the law's machinery for expressing disgust and redi
recting it against homophobes.
All of these hypotheses tum qut to be true. Start with the na
ture of homophobia. Empirical social psychology confirms that
homophobia, like Miller's disgust, is an evaluative sensibility in
fused with hierarchical status norms. Homophobia depends on a
set of beliefs, derived from membership in a social group, that as
sign status according to conventional gender roles.41 Members of
such groups may view homosexuality as a potentially contaminating
influence in part because of anxiety about their own sexual orienta38. In fact, there is essentially no credible psychiatric evidence that it does. See Gary
David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 81, 83-89
(1992).

39. See Co=onwealth v. Carr, 580 A.id 1362, 1365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
10.

40. See Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence, supra note 10; Judge Is Censured, supra note

41. See Gregory M. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social Psychological Perspective
on Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, in BASHERS, BAITERS & BIGOTS: HOMOPHOBIA
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1, 12-13 (John P. De Cecco ed., 1985) [hereinafter Herek, Beyond
"Homophobia"]; Gregory M. Herek, Psychological Heterosexism and Anti-Gay Violence: the
Social Psychology of Bigotry and Bashing, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE
AGAINST L ESBIANS AND GAY MEN 149, 153-54 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Herek, Psychological Heterosexism].

1636

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1621

tion.42 But even more fundamentally, homosexuality threatens
them insofar as they perceive it as subverting the norms that under
write their own status and sense of self-worth: the more widespread
toleration of homosexuality becomes, the less esteem and credit are
due for conforming to conventional, heterosexual gender roles.43
Against the background of such norms, feeling and expressing
homophobia are mechanisms for assuring oneself of one's own
value, 44for acquiring status within the group, 45 and for securing the
status of that group in society by clearly marking out homosexuals
as lower in rank. 46
The judicial decisions, too, conform to Miller's account. Thus,
the court in Bemardski mitigated the defendant's punishment not
on the mechanistic ground that he had been deprived of the capac
ity for self-control, but on the evaluative one that the defendant was
right to be disgusted by his victims' homosexuality. The judge him
self was disgusted by it: for him, the lives of homosexuals, whom he
"put ...at about the same level" as prostitutes, were obviously
worth less than those of good heterosexual persons.47 Indeed,
"cruising" homosexuals threaten good persons, like the judge's own
teenage son, who might be "picked up" and thus lowered to the
homosexuals' level.48 By mitigating Bemardski's sentence on these
42. See, e.g.1 Herek, Psychological Heterosexism, supra note 41, at 155 (asserting that
those anxious about their own orientation "often express[ 1 . . . strong feelings of disgust
toward homosexuality or ... perce[ive] ... danger from gay people of [their] own gender").
43. See Herek, Beyond "Homophobia," supra note 41, at 12 {"As with symbolic racism,
symbolic sexual attitudes express the feeling that cherished values are being violated and that
illegitimate demands are being made for changes in the status quo."); see also Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 987-89 (1995) (using this
aspect of homophobia to explain opposition to lifting of ban on gays in military).
44. ·See Herek, Psychological Heterosexfsm, supra note 41, at 153 {"Such attitudes help
people to increase their self-esteem by expressing important aspects of themselves - by
declaring (to themselves and to others) what sort of people they are. Affirming who one is
often is accomplished by distancing oneself from or even attacking people who represent the
sort of person one is not (or does not want to be).").
·

45. See id. at 154 (asserting that homophobia "strengthens one's sense of belonging to a
particular group and helps an individual to gain acceptance, approval, or love from other
people whom she or he considers important" and that "denigrating [gays and lesbians] solidi
fies one's own status as an insider, one who belongs .to the group").
46. See Karl M. Hamner, Gay-Bashing: A Social Identity Analysis of Violence Against
Lesbians and Gay Men, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN, supra note 41, at 179, 182-83 (arguing that homophobes "use denigration and

discrimination, including violence, to create a negative evaluation of gay men and lesbians
and thereby" raise their own status and that "[a]s a group generally held in low regard by
society, lesbians and gay men are likely to represent a relevant out-group for all quarters of
society, particularly for individuals lower in the social system"); see also Richard A. Berk et
al., Thinking More Clearly About Hate-Motivated Crime, in HATE CRIMES: CoNFRoNTINO
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 41, at 123, 127 (characterizing
homophobic assaults as "symbolic crimes" among competing groups).

47. See Belkin, supra note 10.
48. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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grounds, the judge was clearly motivated by, and clearly sought to
reinforce, hierarchical social norms.
Indeed, Miller's conception of disgust helps to explain a peculiar
doctrinal disconnect in the homosexual panic cases. The usual oc
casion for mitigation under the voluntary manslaughter doctrine is
an uninvited affront that provokes a flash of immediate anger or
fear.49 But as Bernardski illustrates, homophobic killers frequently
plan their killings, oftentimes hunting down victims who pose no
physical threat.50 This species of violence, and the inclination of
decisionmakers to excuse it, are best understand within the logic of
disgust. Whereas anger and fear react to transgressions against
one's own person, disgust takes aim at a more diffuse object namely, the threat that open deviance poses to the status of those
who faithfully abide by dominant norms. Merely rebuffing the odd
homosexual advance isn't enough to protect the homophobe from
that sort of threat; rather he must undertake the "much more inten
sive and problematic labor" of "cleansing and purifying" (p. 26) the
normative environs.51 Mitigating the punishment of those who
shoulder this burden enables legal decisionmakers to show that
they, too, are committed to the norms that underwrite status in
homophobic communities.
Decisions rejecting mitigation do just as much evaluating and
constructing, albeit in the opposite direction. They tell us, as the
court did in Carr, that the homophobic killer's disgust - no matter
how intense-is not "reasonable."52 And in so doing, they repudi
ate norms that value persons according to conventional gender
roles: "the law does not condone or excuse the killing of homosex
uals any more than it condones the killing of heterosexuals."53
But do these decisions -as the conservation thesis predicts also assign homophobes to a lower status because their aberrant dis
gust sensibilities render them"'barbaric and disgusting" (pp.11-12)?
That's at least a reasonable interpretation of thein: , unable to assert
a manslaughter theory, Carr ended up convicted of first degree
murder; what better result to convey that homophobia, like "rape,
child abuse, torture, genocide, predatory murder and maiming" is
one of the "things for which there could be no plausible claim of
right" (p. 36), that our opposition to it is one of the "moral matters
49. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §7.10 (2d ed.
1986).
50. See Comstock, supra note 38, at 96-97.
51. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 372-75 (1997) (showing how "esteem norms" can motivate
individuals to engage in conspicuous disciplining of deviants).
52. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
53. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364.
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for which we can have no compromise"?54 But it's also possible to
read these decisions as being indifferent to disgust or even hostile to
it insofar as that sentiment ranks persons on the basis of their
values.
Laws that enhance the penalty for bias-motivated crimes, how
ever, unambiguously seek to appropriate and redirect disgust. Sup
porters of such laws want the public to understand not just that the
"hate" killers are wrong to be disgusted by their victims, but that
they themselves are "twisted," "warped," "sick," and "disgusting,"
and as a result properly despised as outsiders.55 Severe punishment
is the idiom that the criminal law uses to get that message across.
Indeed, advocates for gays, women, African Americans, Jews, and
others perceive severe punishments as conferring the high status
that violence against them seeks to deny - which is exactly why
political contention surrounding hate crimes is so intense.56
Consider here another disgust-crime story. To show a friend
how easy it would be to get away with killing, Gunner Lindberg, a
self-proclaimed white supremacist, picked out Vietnamese-Ameri
can Thien Minh Ly from a crowd of roller skaters at a high school
playground and stabbed him some fifty times in the body and
54. P. 196. Because the standards that most jurisdictions use to delimit first degree mur
der are essentially contentless, the only basis juries have for assigning killings to that class is
that such killings strike them as exceedingly reprehensible. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra
note 19, at 324-25. The killers whose motivations seem repulsive are likely to dominate this
class. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 437

(1990).

55. See, e.g., James Brooke, Crowd in Denver Rallies Against Skinhead Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A20 ("'They [white supremacist 'skinheads'] are not part of Den

ver's culture. They are not part of Denver's vision. They are not wanted here."' (quoting
Denver Mayor Wellington E. Webb)); Roger Buckwalter, Hate Remains a Poison in Society,
J UPITER CouRIER (Jupiter, Fla.), Sept. 11, 1996, at A4 (describing swastika graffiti: "This
disgusting act by a mental and moral midget . . . was just more evidence - as if any more was
needed - that hate continues to infest this free society . . . ."); Hundreds Mourn Victim of
Skinhead, 19, in Denver, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A16 (quoting mayor at funeral of hate
crime victim: "It's intolerable that something like that happens. It's disgusting to me person
ally that it happened in our city"); Neo-Nazis Still Here, Editorial, SE AITLE TIMES, Mar. 25,
1997, at B4 (denouncing "[t]he disgusting celebration marking Hitler's birthday that's usually
held by [local] neo-Nazis"); John Nichols, 'Time to Stand Up, Be Counted, ' Protest Klan,
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug. 22, 1995, at SA (reporting a local woman's decision to
display a pink triangle "to signal disgust with the Klan's homophobia"); President Starts Anti
Hate Campaign, Cm. TRIB., June 8, 1997, § 1, at 7 ("Voicing disgust over violent bigotry,
President Clinton on Saturday ordered a Justice Department review of laws against hate
crimes and said he will convene a White House conference on the problem next fall."); Ryan
R. Sanderson, Letter to the Editor, Cunanan crime isn't homosexuality, BALTIMO RE SUN,
July 24, 1997, at 14A (reacting to a comment that a gay man deserved to be shot by asserting
that "[t]his is the sickest belief I can imagine").

56. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 2-4 (1995 ); Jean Hampton, The
Retributive idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111,
140-42 (1988 ) ; see also Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment,
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1393-94, 1425 (1988 ) (describing willingness
to execute murderers of African Americans as measure of African American status).
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neck.57 Writing later to a cousin, Lindberg boasted of "kill[ing] a
Jap a while ago."
I walked right up to him and he was scared. I looked at him and said,
"Oh, I thought I knew you," and he got happy that he wasn't gonna
get jumped, then I hit him. I stabbed him in the side about seven or
eight times. He rolled over a little, so I stabbed his back 18 or 19
times. Then he lay flat and I slit . . . his throat on his jugular vein.58

For this crime, Lindberg (who wore a Dallas Cowboys football
jersey every day at trial to mark that team's Super Bowl victory on
the day of the attack59) earned the distinction of becoming the first
offender sentenced to death under a California law authorizing cap
ital punishment for racially motivated killings.6° Civil rights advo
cates - including some who ordinarily oppose the death penalty hailed the sentence on the ground that it appropriately remarked
society's disgust for Lindberg and his deed. "It was an incredibly
disgusting tale of torture and mutilation," the chairman of the Or
ange County Human Relations Commission noted in support of the
sentence. "There's no question this is a sick act of a really troubled
mind."61
B.

Disgust and Punishment

In the last section, I used the evaluative thesis, the hierarchy
thesis, and the conservation thesis to explain the nature of the "hate
cclmes" debate. In this one, I use the moral ambivalence thesis or at least the part of it that asserts that disgust is an indispensable
component of our moral vocabulary - to explain another criminal
law phenomenon: namely, the distinctive forms that punishment
assumes in American criminal law.

To punish serious crimes, the American public has a decided
preference for imprisonment. There's really no alternative to incar
ceration - aside, perhaps, from the death penalty, which I'll put
aside for now - for murderers, armed robbers, and rapists. But
violent offenders such as these make up far less than half the Amer
ican prison population.62 The rest are there for nonviolent offenses
- from theft, to drunk driving, to drug possession, to various and
57. See Thao Hua, Murderer Had Troubled Youth, Psychologist Says, L.A.
1997, at Bl.

TIMES, Oct. 7,

58. Greg Hernandez, Supremacist Sentenced to Death For Hate Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1997, at Al.
59. See Greg Hernandez, O.C. Jury Votes Death for Hate Crime Murder, L.A.
10, 1997, at Al.

TIMES, Oct.

60. See CAL. PENAL Coos §190.2(a)(16) (West 1988); Hernandez, supra note 58.
61. Hernandez, supra note 59.
62. Only 47% of the 989,000 persons incarcerated in state prisons and jails (as of 1995)
were serving time for violent offenses. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Popula
tions in the United States, 1995, at 9, tbl. 1.11 (June 1997) (NCJ-163916). The percentage was
even smaller for persons incarcerated in federal prisons (as of 1996), where nearly 60% of the
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sundry white collar crimes - and serve two years of jail time or less
on average. 6 3 Criminologists of diverse ideologies have long op
posed imprisoning offenders such as these on the grounds that it's
unnecessary to incapacitate them and that their brand of criminality
could be deterred just as well by alternative sanctions such as fines
and community service.64 But this shopworn case for alternative
sanctions has made essentially no impression on legislators, judges,
and sentencing commissioners. 6 5
The political resistance to alternative sanctions seems puzzling
under the conventional theories of punishment. From an optimal
deterrence point of view, the alternatives seem superior because
they are just as effective and less costly to society. 6 6 Retribution
insists that offenders be made to experience pain in strict propor
tion to the moral wrongness of their respective crimes, regardless of
the effects of punishment. 76 But liberty deprivation isn't the only
way to make offenders suffer ; taking their property and appropriat
ing their labor can do that, too. If we can translate short prison
terms into equally painful fines or community service dispositions,
retribution shouldn't as a conceptual matter foreclose alternative
sanctions. 6 8 Indeed, if, as some argue, relatively well-to-do nonvio
lent offenders typically suffer more when imprisoned than down
and-out violent ones, then insisting that the former be imprisoned
rather than fined or ordered to perform community service might
inflict more pain on them for less serious crimes, in violation of the
retributive norm of proportionality. 96
Elsewhere I've tried to solve the alternative sanctions puzzle
with the expressive theory of punishment.7 0 Punishment can't be
reduced to the imposition of suffering. As Henry Hart long ago
observed, a person can suffer just as much discomfort in the mili
tary as he can in prison, and yet only imprisonment - and not coninmates were serving time for drug offenses. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE S1:ATISTICS 1996, at 533, tbl. 636 (1997).

63. See id. at 476, tbl. 5.58 (reporting that the average expected sentence for nonviolent
property offense was 24 months and f9r drug possession, 16 months).
64. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990); Richard A. Pos
ner, Optimal Sentences for White- Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 409-10 (1980).

65. See Kahan, supra note 6, at 592, 605-06.
66. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL.
EcoN. 169, 193-98 (1968); Posner, supra note 38, at 409-11.
67. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW EssAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179-80 (Ferdi
nand Schoeman ed., 1987).
68. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 619.
69. See John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?, 95 J. PoL. EcoN.
1307, 1315 (1987).
70. See Kahan, supra note 21; Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Jncommensurability, 2 BuFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 691 (1998).
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scription ..:___ counts as "punishment," because only imprisonment
expresses moral condemnation.71 We expect punishment to voice
our moral outrage, in addition to protecting us from harm and im
posing deserved suffering. And that's the problem with fines and
community service: they don't express condemnation, or at least
don't express it as unequivocally as imprisonment.72
But why is this the case? What determines whether a particular
mode of affliction expresses condemnation or not? Obviously,
there are many influences, most of which are likely to be a matter
of historical happenstance.73 But drawing on Miller, I want to ar
gue in addition that the adequacy of a punishment along the expres
sive dimension will have a lot to do with whether it resonates with
the public's disgust sensibilities.
On expressive grounds, serious crimes strike us as such - that
is, as crimes and as serious not just because they impair another's
interests, but because they convey that the wrongdoer doesn't re
spect the true value of things.74 To express condemnation, then,
society must respond with a form of punishment that unequivocally
evinces the community's repudiation of the wrongdoer's valuations.
According to Miller, that's what we use "the idiom of disgust" for:
"[i]t signals seriousness, commitment, indisputability, presentness,
and reality" (p. 180); "it marks out moral matters for which we can
have no compromise" (p. 194), harms "for which there could be no
plausible claim of right" (p. 36). It follows that an expressively ef
fective punishment must make clear that we are in fact disgusted
with what the offender has done.
The conventional altematiye sanctions don't do that. Fines, for
example, seem to say that society is willing to put a price tag on a
particular species of crime. That connotation is clearly incompati
ble with disgust: no morally upright person would consent to a dis
gusting act in exchange for cash! Community service, too, fails to
evince disgust. Because we see nothing disgusting in repairing di
lapidated low-income housing, educating the retarded, installing
smoke detectors in old age homes, and the like, it's hard to see the
seriousness and indisputability of society's commitment to con-

71. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims ofthe Criminal Law, 23 L. &
404-05 {1958).

CONTEMP. PROB. 401,

72. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 617-30.
73. See, e.g., id. at 610-17 (examining historical origins of social meaning of imprisonment
and corporal punishment).
74. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, in MURPHY & HAMPToN,
supra note 56, at 35, 43-45; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY &
HAMPToN, supra note 56, at 14, 25.
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demning the behavior of offenders whom it sentences to engage in
such services. Sensibilities like these are in fact commonplace.7 5
Prison, in contrast, does unequivocally evince disgust in Miller's
terms. By stripping individuals of liberty - a venerated symbol of
individual worth in our culture - and by inflicting countless other
indignities - from exposure to the view of others when urinating
and defecating to rape at the hand of other inmates - prison
unambiguously marks the lowness of those we consign to it. At the
same time, imprisonment removes offenders from our midst, shield
ing us from their contaminating influence. Martha Grace Duncan
emphasizes these themes in her recent work, Romantic Outlaws,
Beloved Prisons, 1 6 which probes the social meanings of criminality
and punishment. For her, it is popular disgust for criminals that
explains the durability of the prison, which the public sees as "a
suitably dark, filthy, and remote place" to dispose of the "filth" of
criminality. 7 7
There's no reason to suppose, though, that imprisonment is the
only form of punishment that evinces disgust. Duncan, for exam
ple, uses disgust sensibilities to explain Britain's establishment of a
penal colony in Australia. Historians uniformly regard this policy
as having been a grotesquely inefficient alternative to the simple
expansion of prison space in Britain itself. But delving into the con
temporaneous debates that surrounded this issue, Duncan shows
how transporting criminals recommended itself to eighteenth and
nineteenth century Englishmen because of its power to symbolize
the nation's virtuous attempts to cleanse itself of "refuge" and
"scum" - to expel, in Bentham's words, "the excrementitious
mass" of criminality from the body politic.
1s
For a contemporary disgust-evincing alternative to imprison
ment, consider the revival of shaming penalties, which are now be
ing used for a wide variety of common and white collar offenses
that would otherwise be punished with imprisonment.79 Such pen
alties typically involve an element of self-debasement: thus, bur
glars in Tennessee have been ordered to permit their victims to
enter their homes and take items of the victims' choosing; 08 a New
75. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 621-24, 626-30 (distilling the social meaning of fines and
communitr service from various sources).
76. MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC O UTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCON·
SCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1996).
77. Id. at 146.
78. See id. at 152.
79. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 631-34; Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (unpub
lished, Dec. 15, 1997).
80. See Mark Curriden, Making punishment fit crime often not popular, ATLANTA
CoNST., Jan. 9, 1992, at A3.
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York City slumlord was sentenced to house arrest in one of his rat
infested buildings, where tenants greeted him with a banner that
read, "Welcome, you reptile!";81 a woman in Florida was required
to buy a newspaper ad announcing, "I purchased marijuana with
my two kids in the car."82 Because they "inflict[ ] disgrace and con
tumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner,"83 these punish
ments, like imprisonment, unambiguously mark out offenders as
proper objects of revulsion and separate them, symbolically if not
literally, from virtuous law-abiders.84 Consequently, substituting
shame for imprisonment does not offend the expressive sensibilities
that the conventional alternatives rankle.
The power of shame to express disgust obviously doesn't imply,
by itself, that shame is a morally appropriate punishment. Indeed,
as the moral ambivalence thesis predicts, the disgust they express
and excite is exactly what makes these penalties seem inappropriate
to some.85 Nevertheless, the link between political acceptability of
alternative sanctions and their power to express disgust suggests
that it behooves criminologists and reformers, every bit as much as
it behooves social and political theorists, to learn the lessons of
Miller's work.
C. Disgusting Enough to Die
If disgust supplies the idiom that we use to "voice . . . our
strongest sentiments of moral disapprobation" (p. 20), then we
81. See Don Terry, Landlord in His Own Jail: Tenants Debate His Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1988, at Bl, col. 5; see also Cm. TRIB., July 3, 1988, at Cl (reporting the same sentence for
a California slumlord); John Larrabee, Fighting Crime with a Dose of Shame, USA TODAY,
June 19, 1995, at 3A (reporting that Framingham, Massachusetts, places banners with the
name of a slumlord on a building after condemning a unit).
82. Susannah A. Nesmith, Advertise your guilt, judge orders woman after dmg case plea,
PALM BEACH PoST, Nov. 23, 1996, at lA.
83. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 S.2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (internal citation
omitted). See also Carol-Faye Ashcraft, DUI Offenders on Display, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 8, 1990, at 6 (criticizing fines because they "may not mean much" while praising shaming
penalties on the ground that "public humiliation" is "more sobering"); Maureen Fan, Red
Faced Offender: ls It a Real Shame?, NEWSDAY, June 21, 1995, at A27 ("'One of the reasons
why people find these kinds of things appealing is not only because they think it'll make them
safer . . . but it's also a way of expressing outrage."' (quoting Bob Gang, head of the Correc
tional Association of New York)); Punishment (editorial), CIN. ENO., June 2, 1994, at AlO
("'It's my way to impress upon him the humiliation of the act."' (quoting a judge who or
dered a man convicted of assault to permit his wife to spit in his face)); Scarlet Bumper, TIME,
June 17, 1985, at 52 ("'[H]umiliation as punishment is valid . . . .'").
84. Indeed, this separation can be more than symbolic to the extent that shaming penal
ties effectively facilitate shunning of the offender. See Eruc A. POSNER, LAW, COOPERATION,
AND RATIONAL CH01CE, Ch. 7 (Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming 1999).
85. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PsYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 645 (1997); James Q. Whitman, What's Wrong with Inflicting
Shaming Sanctions, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). For a normative defense of shaming penal
ties, see Kahan, supra note 21, at 637-50; Dan M. Kahan, It's a Shame We Have None, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at Al6.
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should expect to see disgust playing a critical role in administration
of the criminal punishment that voices disapprobation in the most
emphatic terms - namely, the death penalty. And we do. The
overwhelming majority of states that have the death penalty au
thorize the sentencer to impose it when the murder is "outrageously
vile wanton or inhuman," "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,"
or the like.86 This sentencing factor - which I'll refer to as the
"outrageously vile" standard - singles out killings that are so nau
seatingly cruel, and killers whose own tastes are so sickeningly de
praved, that the only just disposition is literally to dispose of the
offender.
The cases applying the "outrageously vile" standard involve
tales that "sicken us in the telling."87 They are the stories of men
who gang rape an eleven-year old girl in the woods, poke sharp
sticks through her vagina into her abdominal cavity, and then smash
her skull with a brick, while she begs for her life;88 who cut out the
vocal cords of a witness to a crime and then amputate his feet and
hands with an electric saw;89 who leave the scene of a terrifying
nighttime burglary with the eighty-year-old victim dying in prayer, a
knife protruding from her eye socket.90 (As Miller himself observes
- in a much more prosaic context - it is impossible to write of
disgusting things without becoming disgusting oneself (p. 5).)
These cases graphically bear out Miller's contention that we cannot
"put cruelty first among vices" without counting properly directed
disgust as a virtue (p. 202): it is not enough to become angry when
one hears of these atrocities; one must want to retch.
The "outrageously vile" standard, moreover, recognizes that we
can be sickened not only by what brutal murderers do, but also by
what they value and hence who they are. Thus, the sentencer is
entitled to find the standard satisfied by facts that "evidenc[e] de
basement or perversion," or that show that the defendant "rel
ish[ed] the murdei:."91 Consider here the man who enjoyed
shooting a woman so much that (with no additional stimulation) he
experienced an orgasm, and who thereafter entertained himself by
listening to music on her stereo system and drinking wine from her
86. Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases - the Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941, 943 (1986).
87. P. 36. Such cases are gruesomely catalogued in Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation,

Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statlltory Aggravating
Circumstance that Murder Was Heinous, Cruel, Depraved or the Like - Post Gregg Cases, 63
-

A.LR.4th 478 (1988).
88. See State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 621-22, 631 (La. 1984).
89. See Cavanaugh v. State, 729 P.2d 481 (Nev. 1986).
90. See Battle v. Armontrout, 814 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (E.D. Mo. 1993), affd. sub nom
Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547 (8th Cir. 1994).
91. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990) (plurality opinion) (internal quotes and
citation omitted).
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kitchen before finally hanging her from a door knob in a parting
gesture of contempt.92 Or the men who forced their victim to lick
beer from the floor and to eat her used sanitary napkin before kill
ing her.93 Or the one who cut his victim's chest open to observe her
heart.94 The sentencer's revulsion in such cases, moreover, needn't
be linked to the suffering that such depraved behavior inflicts on
the victims; even cases in which � killer mutilates the victim's body,
or has sex with
it, after the victim's death can satisfy the "outra
,
geously vile' standard.95 Just as the evaluative thesis suggests, it is
the killer's very appetite to do what disgusts us that marks him as
"barbaric and disgusting" (pp. 11- 12), enough so in fact to justify
his execution.
Commentators tend to view the "outrageously vile" factor with
a constitutionally jaundiced eye. The first principle of the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence - represented in Furman v.
Georgia96 - commands that the sentencer's discretion be con
strained by precisely worded statutory aggravating factors. The
"outrageously vile" factor came to grief over the Furman principle
early on, on the ground that it was too vague to separate the worst
killings from all the rest: "A person of ordinary sensibility could
fairly characterize almost every murder
as 'outrageously or wan
,,,
tonly vile, horrible and inhuman[,] the Court claimed.97 Thereaf
ter, state courts attempted to revive the factor by fashioning
"limiting constructions."98 But as critics noted, these constructions
- defining "heinous,"
, for example, as "hatefully or shockingly evil:
grossly bad"; "cruel' as "disposed to inflict pain esp[ ecially] in a
wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic"; and "depraved"
as "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deteriora
tion" - seemed no more determinate or constraining than the stat
utory terms they are explicating.99 The Court has nevertheless
upheld such constructions of the "outrageously vile" factor �s con
stitutionally suffident: "an aggravating factor of this nature," the
Court now recognizes, "is not susceptible of mathematical
precision. "100
92. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 (Va. 1983).
93. See Thompson v. State, 389 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 1980).
94. See Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 1981).
95. See, e.g., Hance v. State, 268 S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1980).
96. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
97. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980); accord Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988).
98. See Rosen, supra note 86, at 968-70.
99. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 693-97 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rosen,
supra note 86, at 968-70.
100. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655 (plurality opinion); accord Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 777
(1990); see also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (upholding "utter disregard" standard
construed as meaning "pitiless").
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The tortured constitutional history of the "outrageously vile "
factor itself testifies to the indispensable contribution that disgust
makes to the capacity for moral discernment. As Miller would pre
dict, courts recognize the role of disgust sensibilities in revealing to
us the most singular acts of wickedness and depravity, the ones we
are obliged to strike back against in the most emphatic form of ac
tion that our conventions and laws make available to us. And the
power that disgust gives us to discern and remark such atrocities is
indeed insusceptible of being captured by - reduced to - a pre
cise verbal formula. If being guided by such a sensibility is incom
patible with the demand for formally determinate rules in capital
sentencing, then, unsurprisingly, it is that demand, and not the sen
101
sibility, that gives way.

D. Disgust vs. Mercy
But we should also expect the durability of disgust in capital
sentencing to be a cause of unease. The moral ambivalence thesis
sees disgust as furnishing not only indispensable but also imperfect
moral guidance. In the grip of disgust, Miller argues, we too readily
blame persons for deformities of character over which they have no
control. In the nonlegal domain, we construct conventions - in
cluding the distinction between aesthetics and morals - to check
this feature of disgust. In law, constraining disgust is the role that
we assign to mercy in capital sentencing.
The place of mercy is secured by the rule - established in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Lockett v. Ohio1°2 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma103 - that the state may do nothing to prevent the sen
tencer "from considering . ..any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de
"1°4 By
fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
obliging the sentencer to listen to the defendant's story in the terms
in which he chooses to tell it, the Lockett-Eddings rule recognizes
that in even the most aggravated cases we may be moved by "'com
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties
of humankind.'" 105
101. Indeed, one might argue that the ultimate vagueness of the "outrageously vile" stan
dard is, in this sense, a virtue, because any determinate rule would necessarily disable the
sentencer from recognizing the diverse forms that cruelty and depravity can assume. For a
perceptive (and doctrinally heretical) argument to this effect, see Paul J . Heald, Medea and
the Un-Man: Literary Guidance in the Determination of Heinousness Under Maynard v. Cart
wright, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 571 (1995).
102. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
103. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
104. 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett).
105. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 n.7 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (plurality opinion).
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The tension between the Furman rule and the Lockett-Eddings
rule is patent.106 The former tells the state that it must adopt statu
tory factors that constrain the capital sentencer's discretion, the lat
ter that it must not. More than one Justice has concluded that these
directives are conceptually and practically irreconcilable.101
But why assume the values at stake in capital sentencing admit
of rational harmonization? According to Miller, our moral world is
tragically configured: both disgust and individual autonomy make
legitimate claims upon us; any approach to moral decisionmaking
that even purported to dispel the tension between them would nec
essarily blind us to the insights of one or the other or both. The
only proper response to this conflict is to avoid giving "any one
moral sentiment the power to govern all situations in which it may
be elicited" (p. 202)
to structure our moral conventions to assure
that both the norms embodied in disgust and the norms embodied
in "other moral sentiments, like guilt and benevolence" (p. 197) are
given free range to appraise the situation.
Furman and Lockett-Eddings structure the capital sentencing
process to reproduce this tension-embracing solution. Furman
gives free range to our moral-condemning norms. It is at that point
that the law allows disgust to appraise the offenders' crime through
aggravating factors such as the "outrageously vile" standard or Cal
ifornia's racial-hatred factor. But under Lockett-Eddings, the law
tests the claims of our disgust by creating the space for mercy. That
sentiment embodies our condemnation-abatement norms, including
recognition of the role that "the diverse frailties of humankind"
may have played in making the offender an object of revulsion.
Whatever tension there is between Furman and Lockett-Eddings is
thus a genuine tension in our moral values; the response of that
doctrinal regime is to conserve the insights of all our moral senti
ments rather than privileging only a subset of them.
Consistent with the moral ambivalence thesis, the law remains
faithful to both the certainty of our disgust sensibilities and the sec
ond-order doubts we have about whether that certainty is war
ranted. When we contemplate the cruelty of his deeds, and the
depravity of his motivations, we may have no doubt that a Gunner
Lindberg or a Stephen Roy Carr is a proper recipient of the law's
most severe punishment. But we know that even a Lindberg or a
-

106. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991).
107. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 909-911, (1993) (Thomas, J., concur
ring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 661-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con
curring in the judgment). For attempts to dispel the tension, see Stephen P. Garvey, "As The
Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 989, 115-122
(1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & Pull. A.FF. 83 (1993).
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Carr is likely to have a story to tell - of the warping influences of
childhood neglect; of psychoses, intermingled with drug abuse; of
traumatic events, such as prison rape or perceived racial discrimina
tionios - a story that seeks to persuade us not that we are wrong to
be disgusted by him, but that he has become disgusting for reasons
that he couldn't control.109 Such stories may not move us; indeed,
the California jury that sentenced Lindberg to death obviously was
not moved. But the law's unwillingness to put such offenders to
death before it even hears how they became what they are evi
dences the war that mercy wages against the imperial ambitions of
our disgust.

V.

EvALUATING DISGUST IN CRIMINAL LAW

My aim so far has been to show that disgust does in fact play a
central role in criminal law. But nothing I've said implies, necessar
ily, that this role is morally justified. Indeed, seeing how much con
sequence the law invests in our disgust sensibilities should make us
more intent, not less, on determining whether the law's confidence
in that sentiment is warranted.
I now want to take a step in the direction of vindicating that
confidence. I don't intend to advance a complete defense of disgust
in criminal law, but drawing on Miller, I will address what I take to
be the most powerful claim that can be made on disgust's behalf namely, that it is essential to perceiving and condemning cruelty. If
this is so, then opponents of disgust in criminal law will be hard
pressed to prove that disgust should be extricated, as opposed to
merely constrained and tested by other sentiments such as mercy. I
will also take up the question whether the coiinection between dis
gust and hierarchy makes disgust an illegitimate guide for criminal
law decisionmaking within a liberal political regime.

A. Disgust and Cruelty
Miller's strongest normative claim - that we cannot "put cru
elty first among vices" without regarding disgust as a moral virtue
(p. 202) - is also the most contentious. In every case in which
disgust exhorts us to lash out at cruelty, won't we have additional
sufficient reasons to punish? Alternatively, if all we have to go on
108. See Co=onwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (recount
ing Carr's evidence of child neglect and prison rape); Thao Hua, supra note 57, at Bl (report
ing defense evidence that Lindberg suffered from psychosis exacerbated by drug use and had
been victim of perceived mistreatment while growing up in Japan).
109. In fact, far from denying the reprehensibility of the offender's conduct, mercy pre
supposes it. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 367-71. Because mercy bears this
signification, it enables us to withhold the degree of reprobation that our disgust calls for
without endorsing in any w ay the wrongdoer's own reprehensible (and, in the view of our
disgust, potentially contaminating) valuations. Or at least this is the aspiration.
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is disgust, why should we trust our perception that punishment is
just?
The "outrageously vile" cases furnish a tempting, but ultimately
inadequate, basis of support for Miller's position.11° We might in
deed wonder about the moral acuity of someone who purported not
to be sickened by such atrocities. But condemnation in such cases
is overdetermined: wholly apart from whether they revolt us, kill
ers who mutilate and torture, who savor the suffering and degrada
tion of their victims, warrant severe punishment for purposes of
deterrence and incapacitation. What's more, for many - myself
included - the lessons that such cases can teach us seem clouded
by the morally problematic status of the death penalty itself.
What we need to test Miller's claim, then, is a noncapital case in
which disgust seems both necessary and sufficient to remark the
cruelty of an offender's behavior. For this consider the request of
Dennis Beldotti.111
Beldotti committed murder to gratify his sadistic sexual appe
tites. His female victim, strangled and stuffed into trash bags, was
found in the bathroom of his home. Bruises and cuts covered her
body. Her nipples had been sliced off. Incisions rimmed her pubic
area. From Beldotti's bedroom, the police recovered numerous
nude photographs of the victim: some of.these had belonged to the
victim and her husband and had apparently been stolen by Beldotti
from the victim's home; others had been taken 'by Beldotti himself,
after the victim's death, and showed dildos penetrating her vagina
and anus.112 Based on these and other facts, the jury found that
Beldotti's crime reflected "extreme atrocity or cruelty," a factor jus
tifying life imprisonment without parole.113
Massachusetts law provides that at the conclusion of criminal
proceedings the property seized and used in evidence should be
dealt with in a manner consistent with "the public interest."114
Beldotti requested that the state return certain items of his to his
representatives outside of prison. These included "four dildos";
"bondage paraphernalia"; "one plastic encased photo of the vic
tim"; "female undergarments"; "one broken 'Glad Heavy Weight
Trashbag' box" - presumably the one containing the bags he used
to wrap his victim; "twenty-four magazines depicting naked pubes
cent and prepubescent girls and boys"; and scores of pornographic
tapes and magazines "bearing such titles as 'Tamed & Tortured,'
See supra section IV.C.
See Beldotti v. Co=onwealth, 669 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996).
See Beldott� 669 N.E.2d at 224.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 §§ 1-2 (West 1996); Ray Richard, Beldotti Con
victed in Needham Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1989, at 17.

110.
111.
112.
113.

114. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 3 (West 1996).
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'Tit & Body Torture,' and 'Tortured Ladies.'" 115 The state opposed
Beldotti's request on the ground that surrendering these items
"would justifiably spark outrage, disgust, and incredulity on the
part of the general public." 116 "The overwhelming public interest
here," the state's attorney argued, "is that they be thrown in the
trash can where they belong. This has nothing to do with free ex
pression. It has to do with the degradation of a young woman by a
depraved individual.'' 117
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals agreed. "Although prop
erty may not be forfeited simply because it is offensive or repug
nant," the court observed,
we see a connection between the property that Beldotti seeks to have
returned to him and the crime he committed. The murder for which
Beldotti is serving his life-term was particularly gruesome; he photo
graphed the victim's naked torso after inserting dildos into her vagina ..
and anus and after sexually mutilating her body. The items that
Beldotti seeks to have returned to him can be seen as being directly
related to those acts, as having influenced his behavior, or as being
relevant to an understanding of the psychological or physical circum
stances under which the crime was committed.11 s

"In these circumstances," the court concluded "to return the prop
erty would be would be so offensive to basic concepts of decency
treasured in a civilized society, that it would undermine the confi
dence that the public has a right to expect in the criminal justice
system." 119
My guess is that this decision will strike nearly everyone as in
disputably correct. What I want to argue is that there is in fact no
viable basis for that intuition other than the one the court gave namely, the disgustingness of Beldotti's request.
What other rationale could there be? The idea that possession
of such items would undermine Beldotti's "rehabilitation" makes
no sense, insofar as he was serving a term of life without parole.
Perhaps inmates shouldn't be allowed to possess such materials, all
of which could cause disruption inside a prison, and some of which
could actually be used to torture other prisoners. But Beldotti
sought to have the materials released only to his representatives
outside of prison; whether Beldotti himself could have taken pos
session of the items, the court recognized, was a separate issue that

115. Beldotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225.
116. 669 N.E.2d at 225.
117. Patricia Nealon, X-Rated Materials Held by Court Sought, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2,
1992, at 21 (quoting district attorney).
118. Beldotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225.
119. Be/dotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225.
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would have had to have been addressed in the first instance by
prison administrators.120
It might be thought that no one - in or outside of prison should be allowed to possess legally obscene materials. But
preventing the consumption of obscenity would hardly be a disgust
neutral ground for the decision. What's more, as the court recog
nized, the mere possession of the seized magazines and tapes, as
opposed to the distribution of them, would not have violated state
law.121
Forfeiture of the property might be defended as a punitive mea
sure aimed at promoting general deterrence. But deterrence
doesn't explain why Beldotti should be made to forfeit these partic
ular articles rather than some others. Assume that imposition of a
fine of a certain size could deter as effectively as the forfeiture of
Beldotti's dildos and trashbags, his picture of the victim, and his
"Tit & Body Torture" magazines and tapes. Would it then be ac
ceptable - morally - to let Beldotti have his toys after all in ex
change for a payment of that amount? If the answer is no,
deterrence can't be the reason why. What grounds do we have,
anyway, for thinking that the forfeiture of Beldotti's property adds
any marginal deterrence to that achieved by sentencing him to life
imprisonment without parole? If our confidence in the intuition
that Beldotti was correctly decided outstrips our access to the em
pirics that would substantiate the deterrent benefits of forfeiture of
his property, then something else besides deterrence explains the
intuition.
That something is disgust. As the court recognized, the items
Beldotti wanted bore the unmistakable aura of his crime. Bureau
cratically processing his request - treating it as if it were no more
remarkable than a claim for a stolen wallet or an impounded auto
mobile - would have trivialized the unfathomable cruelty of his
deeds. Indeed, because the atrocity of his crime consisted largely in
the satisfaction he took in defiling his victim, restoring these items
to his control, and thereby facilitating even his vicarious enjoyment
of them, would have allowed Beldotti, as the state argued, to con
tinue degrading her after death. By connecting the denial of
Beldotti's request to "public confidence" in the law, moreover, the
court recognized that enabling Beldotti to satisfy his tastes would
inevitably have made the state itself complicit in his depravity. The
only way to avoid being tainted by his request was to throw
Beldotti's misogynistic magazines and his trash bags and his dildos
and his kiddy porn "in the trash can where they belong" - rhetori120. See Beldotti, 699 N.E.2d at 224.
121. See Beldotti, 699 N.E.2d at 224.
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cally, if not literally. All of these motivations and thoughts are na
tive to disgust as an evaluative sentiment.
I don't mean to exaggerate the significance of this analysis. Ob
viously, showing the indispensability of disgust to the result in one
case doesn't prove Miller's claim that disgust is essential to our per
ception of, and opposition to, cruelty. But I do see Beldotti as an
appropriate challenge to put to those who might advocate a disgust
free conception of criminal law. In effect, it turns the questions
with which I started this section completely around: What besides
disgust (and "just so" stories) can really explain the perception that
granting his request would be wrong? And if nothing else does,
what could possibly justify committing ourselves to a regime that
quiets so urgent a moral instinct?
B. Disgust and !!liberalism
One answer might be liberalism. Disgust is constructed by and
reinforces status norms. It does not merely condemn, but also re
marks the lowness and inferiority of its object. As Miller himself
recognizes, such sensibilities are marred by their disreputable his
tory, having been used to "maintain brutal and indefensible re
gimes" (p. 202) - misogynistic, racist, classist, and homophobic
ones, among others. Opposition to such rankings motivates mod
ern liberalism, which is naturally suspicious of disgust. Indeed,
Miller credits the declining prominence of disgust in our moral dis
course to "[a] newer style of moralist, . . . one for whom tolerance
and respect for persons are fundamental virtues" and who therefore
"wish[es] our disgust sensitivities lowered so we would be less sus
ceptible to finding difference and strangeness sources of disgust." 122
The insights of liberalism give us just as much reason to be sus
picious of disgust in criminal law, where, as Bernardski reminds us,
its role has often been just as brutal and indefensible as it has else
where. Nevertheless, drawing on the conservation thesis, I want to
suggest that renouncing the guidance of disgust in criminal law
would in fact defeat, rather than advance, liberal ends.
The strongest version of this argument objects on principle to
the perceived opposition between liberalism and hierarchy. It's
true that liberal regimes renounce (at least in theory) rankings of a
particular sort - such as those based on race, gender, and class but they haven't renounced all perceptions of high and low, noble
and base, worthy and unworthy. Even egalitarians hold pedophiles
and sadists in low esteem, for example, not just because such per
sons threaten physical harm, but because their values reveal them
28.

122. P. 179. For a critique of Miller along exactly these lines, see Nussbaum, supra note
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to be despicable. Indeed, as Miller points out, those who seek to
raise the status of historically subordinated groups seek to reshape
our "emotional economy" so that we'll come to see racists, sexists,
and homophobes, among others, as debased in exactly the same
way (p. 235). On this account, the proper course for liberalism is
.not to obliterate disgust, but to reform its objects so that we come
to value what is genuinely high, to despise what is genuinely low.
The criminal law has traditionally been seen as performing a
"moral educative" function of this sort.123 Punishment is thought to
discourage criminality not only by raising the "price" of such mis
conduct, but also by instilling aversions to it.124 It's no surprise that
legal moralizing of this sort has been, and continues to be, an instru
ment of "brutal and indefensible regimes." But why should the
proponents of defensible regimes declare a unilateral cease-fire
rather than fighting the indefensible ones on their own terms? Er
ecting a liberal counter-regime of disgust, I've tried to show, is ex
actly the aim behind "hate crime" laws, which seek to make the
proponents of illiberal species of hierarchy the object of our revul
sion. It seems unlikely that a philosophical abstraction as malleable
as "liberalism" is conceptually incompatible with this form of legal
moralizing.125 But if it is, so much the worse for liberalism.
This is, as I've indicated, the strongest response to the liberal
critique of disgust in criminal law; I want to lay more emphasis,
however, on a weaker and more pragmatic rejoinder. This position
views liberal opposition to disgust not as defective in principle, but
as self-deluding and self-defeating in practice. Styles of criminal
law theorizing that purport to dispense with disgust do nothing in
reality to mute its influence. They do, however, disguise it, and in
so doing prolong the life of outmoded and illiberal norms in the
law.
The dominant forms of criminal law theory both have liberal
antecedents. Voluntarism, which derives from Kantian moral phi
losophy, treats punishment as justified if, and to the extent that, the
offender's behavior stems from choice.126 Consequentialism, which
derives from utilitarian theory, views punishment as warranted if,
and to the extent that, visiting suffering on the offender promotes
123. See, e.g., Johs Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sa. 176, 179 {1952); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory
of Punishment, 13 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 {1984).
124. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as Prefer
ence-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1.
125. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 359-62.
126. The most influential voluntarist account is that of H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART,
PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 46- 49 (1968).
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desired states of affairs.127 Consistent with the liberal bias against
public moralizing, both theories reflect the mechanistic rather than
the evaluative conception of emotion, and thus assign no normative
significance to the valuations that construct disgust sensibilities.128
Neither theory, however, has succeeded in banishing such evalu
ations from the law. Voluntarism seeks to "lower" our "disgust sen
sitivities" by making excuses depend not on the quality of
offenders' emotional evaluations but rather on the destructive ef
fect of emotions (or "impulses") on offenders' choice capacities; its
focus is not on who is too virtuous, but on who is too sick to be
punished. Yet juries are notoriously resistant to excusing mentally
unbalanced offenders who commit heinous crimes, no matter how
obvious the origins of such behavior in pathology:129 "[t]he mud
dle-headed reformers who seek to make crime a matter of illness
rather than culpable intention," Miller writes, "fail to realize that
we do not cease blaming just because someone is sick" (p. 203). At
the same time, if we insist that decisionmakers speak in a mechanis
tic rather than an evaluative idiom, then we can expect them to
describe as "sick" the offenders who are too virtuous to be held
accountable for their crimes. Consider the historic use of the "irre
sistible impulse" conception of insanity as a vehicle for excusing all
manner of virtuous outlaws, from the cuckold to the battered
woman.130 And if their disgust sensibilities tell decisionmakers that
a particular offender, such as the homophobe, deserves solicitude,
we can expect them to see him as excusably "sick," too, a lesson
taught to us by the selective receptivity of the law to the "homosex
ual panic" defense.131
The same story can be told about consequentialism. It attempts
to suppress evaluative appraisals by connecting excuse to the rela
tive dangerousness of an impassioned or impulsive offender.132 But
which impassioned offenders juries and judges see as dangerous
127. This is the position associated with Jeremy Bentham, see Jeremy Bentham, An Intro
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 162
(1961), and his successors, see, e.g., Becker, supra note 66; Posner, An Economic Theory of
the Criminal Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985).
128. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 301-05; see also Claire 0. Finkelstein,
Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense Jn Law, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 251 (1995) (dis

cussing "voluntarist" and "welfarist" theories of criminal law).
129. Empirical evidence, for example, suggests that juries, no matter how instructed on
the definition of insanity, give little weight to the condition of the defendant's psyche and
focus instead on a cluster of factors relevant to his culpability. See, e.g., Norman J. Fmkel &
Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe "Insanity," 13 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 41, 57 (1989);
James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 521, 526 (1991).
130. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 345-50.
131. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide:
II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1262, 1280-82 (1937).
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necessarily depends on which victims they see as valuable enough
to be protected from harm: cuckolds/battered women aren't all
that dangerous, unless one ·happens to be a paramour/tyrannical
man.133 And if disgust sensibilities tell "the decisionmaker that
homosexuals are worth little, then that decisionmaker will predict
ably see the killing of one as a "one-time tragedy" committed by an
otherwise normal person who the decisionmaker can be "confident
. . . w[ill] not kill again."134

In short, the criminal-law theories associated with modern liber
alism don't genuinely purge the law of disgust. They only push dis
gust down below the surface of law, where its influence is harder to
detect.
And that's bad. It should be clear that there's-no way to guaran
tee that decisionmakers will be guided by liberal rather than illib
eral disgust sensibilities. But their sensibilities are likely to deviate
least from the moral ideal when the evaluations they embody are
most fully exposed to view. The prospect of publicly owning up to
reliance on anachronistic or illib�ral disgust sensibilities can itself
shame decisionmakers into deciding on some other basis. Even
more important, when we force decisionmakers to be open about
the normative commitments that underlie their disgust sensibilities,
members of the public are fully appraised of what those commit
ments are. This outcome facilitates the kind of self-conscious com
petition between liberal and illiberal conceptions of disgust, and
between disgust and other moral sentiments, that is essential to re
deeming disgust under the moral ambivalence thesis.
To illustrate, return once more to Bernardski.135 The judge's
conclusion that the lives of Bernardski's gay victims just weren't
worth enough to justify a sentence of life imprisonment was outra
geous - indeed, disgusting. And it provoked public disgust. The
judge was formally censured for his remarks anq thereafter de
feated in an election in which the support of women and gays for
the judge's opponent turned out to be decisive.136 In the wake of
this and other incidents, moreover, the Texas legislature enacted a
hate crimes statute that expressly enhances the penalty for crimes
motivated by bias against any group.137 Had the judge cloaked his
133. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 311-12.
134. See Steven Hunt, Victim's Family, Gays Say Killer Got Off Too Easy, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 16, 1997, at Cl; Judge Draws Protest After Cutting Sentence of Gay Man's Killer,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at A15 (reporting the comments of a judge explaining the lenient
sentence for a man who hunted down and then shot between the eyes a gay man who had
earlier propositioned him).
135. See supra notes .10-17 and accompanying text.
136. See Lisa Belkin, Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat ofJudge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
4, 1992, at B20, col. 5.
137. See TEX. PENAL CooE ANN. § 12.47 (West 1994); TEX. CooE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
42.014 (West Supp. 1997); see also Clay Robison, Richards signs hate crimes bill into law,
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disgust in the rhetoric of voluntarism or consequentialism, it's very
unlikely that his_ .decision would have furnished so salient a focal
point for rooting out the illiberal sensibilities that the judge's deci
sion embodied.
To Miller's four theses, we can now add a fifth: the self-delusion
As one might surmise from the conservation thesis, the kind
of hierarchic rankings characteristic of disgust are too durable to be
driven from the scene by the morally antiseptic idiom of liberalism.
Those who believe otherwise are fooling themselves. If we let them
fool us, those of us who oppose brutal and indefensible hierarchies
in law risk becoming their unwitting defenders.

thesis.

VI.

SEEING DISGUST IN CRIMINAL LAW

My goal in this review was to suggest the value of Miller's work
for remedying the blindness of criminal law theory to disgust. I'll
now take stock of some of the things that his account allows us to
see.
For Miller, disgust is not an instinctive and unthinking aversion
but rather a thought-pervaded evaluative sentiment. Disgust em
bodies the appraisal that its object is low and contaminating and the
judgment that we must insulate ourselves from it lest it compromise
our own status. By feeling and expressing disgust, we thus reinforce
the hierarchical social norms that give disgust its evaluative content.
Armed with thi_s account, I've argued,' we can make sense of a
range of issues that seem anomalous under the conventional theo
ries of criminal law. Why, for example, is the law of two minds on
homophobic violence? The answer is that society is of two minds
on what we should regard as low and contaminating - homosexu
ality or homophobia. Indeed, I've argued that the "hate crimes"
debate is better understood as a "disgust crimes" debate, in which
adherents of competing conceptions of virtue war for control over
the law's expressive capital.
Why do citizens stubbornly resist the use of fines and commu
nity service despite the efficiency of such penalties for nonviolent
crimes? At least part of the answer is that the social meaning of
these penalties render them less effective than prison in remarking
the low status of criminals and in cordoning them off, literally and
symbolically, from the rest of us. Because shaming penalties, in
contrast, do unambiguously express disgust, they encounter much
less political resistance as an alternative to imprisonment.

Hous. CHRoN., June 20, 1993, State section, at 3 (noting that the purpose of the legislation is
to enhance "criminal offenses motivated by the victims' race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orien
tation or national origin").
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Why does the "horribly vile" standard persist as a staple of capi
tal sentencing, notwithstanding- ·its incurable :vagueness? The an
swer is the necessity of disgust for perceiving and motivating
opposition to cruelty. At the same time, the law's consciousness of
the power of disgust to overshoot the mark . to condemn individ
uals for defects of character that they cannot control - enjoins the
law to check disgust with mercy, thereby reproducing in doctrine an
irreconcilable conflict that exists within our own moral sentiments.
Miller's account also helps us to frame important normative
questions about the role of disgust in criminal law. Miller is ambiv
alent about disgust. He recognizes the historical contribution that
disgust has made to reinforcing unjust hierarchies, from racism to
misogyny. But at the same time, he suggests. that no abstract the
ory, and no other moral sentiment, can reproduce the work that
disgust does in voicing our opposition to moral atrocities. Miller
counsels us not to dispel the tension between disgust and other
moral norms, but to embrace it through evaluative appraisals that
pit disgust against other moral sentiments. I've argued that the
same tension pervades the role of disgust in criminal law, and that
we should try to resolve it in a similar way - that is, not by oppos
ing disgust per se, but by opposing disgust to other sentiments such
as mercy, and by opposing unjust forms of disgust with just ones.
Finally, Miller helps us to see why the dominant theories of
criminal law have so little to say about the prominence of judg
ments of and about disgust. This inattention, I've suggested, is not
so much an oversight as a strategy. The dominant theories of crimi
nal law are aligned with a style of moral theorizing thatis suspicious
of disgust because of its origin in hierarchy and its indifference to
individual autonomy. By directing our· attention to other grounds
for determining the law's content, the dominant theories attempt to
distract us from disgust, and thus to blunt the illiberal influence of
that sentiment on our institutions.
As well-intentioned as this strategy might be, however, it is ulti
mately self-defeating. Ignoring disgust does nothing to counteract
the force that that sentiment exerts over our moral imaginations.
Indeed, dispensing with disgust leaves theory without the rhetorical
resources to oppose the forces of illiberalism, to whom the hierar
chic and intolerant idiom of disgust is no embarrassment.

In short, the hear-no-, see-no-, speak-no-disgust strategy makes
theory politically impotent as well as morally obtuse. Miller's ac
count is the perfect antidote.

